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THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL: A
SUMMARY OF ISSUES IN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Day v. NLO, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The summary jury trial has proven to be an effective tool in the fight against
the explosion of litigation in federal courts.2 In the thirteen years since its
inception,3 many issues involving the summary jury trial have been disputed. Day
v. NLO, Inc.4 provides an excellent example of this area of law as it raises three
such issues in dispute. The case law is divided over: 1) whether the federal
courts have power to compel parties to participate in summary jury trial
proceedings; 2) whether the courts have the power to compel certain
representatives to attend such proceedings; and 3) whether the courts have power
to either close or open such proceedings to the public.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The plaintiff, David Day, and others were workers and frequent visitors of
the Feed Materials Production Center (FMPC) in Fernald, Ohio.6 The defendant,
National Lead of Ohio (NLO), developed and manufactured nuclear weapons at
the FMPC.7 The plaintiffs, as a class, brought this personal injury action claiming
that NLO caused them: 1) an increased risk of disease; 2) emotional distress
because of such increased risk; and 3) disease itself."
In ruling on the motion for class certification, the court ordered the parties
to participate in a summary jury trial, open to the public, in order to promote
settlement of the dispute.9 The scope of this Note is limited to the Ruling on the
1. 147 F.R.D. 148 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
2. See infra note 15.
3. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
4. 147 F.R.D. 148.
5. See id.
6. Day, 147 F.R.D. at 150.
7. Id
8. Id
9. Id The order of the class certification and summary jury trial can be found at Day v. NLO,
Inc., 144 F.R.D. 330 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
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Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Jury Trial. In support
of this motion, the defendants asked the court to close the proceedings, contending
that the publicity surrounding an open summary jury trial would prevent the
defendants from receiving a fair trial on the merits.'" The defendants further
stated that if the summary jury trial was open, they would not actively participate
in the proceedings." The plaintiffs contended that it would be impracticable to
close the proceedings because of the large number of plaintiffs involved.'
The court held that it had the power to compel parties to participate in
summary jury trials and that such power extended to the authority to open the
proceedings to the public. 3 The court further held that for a summary jury trial
to be an effective settlement technique, courts must have the power to require the
attendance of certain representatives of the parties at the summary jury trial
proceedings. 4
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Summary Jury Trial:
History and Procedure
The current flood of litigation in federal courts 5 has forced district court
judges to exercise their inherent powers to manage their dockets' by employing
innovative dispute resolution techniques. One such technique is the summary jury
trial. The summary jury trial is a form of alternative dispute resolution conceived
by the Honorable Thomas D. Lambros, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio. 7 It was first used by Judge Lambros in 1980 in a
products liability case after all other attempts at settlement had been exhausted.'"
The summary jury trial has since become an increasingly common form of
resolving disputes prior to trial.' 9
10. Day, 147 F.RD. at 152.
11. d at 154 n6.
12. Id at 151.
13. Id
14. Id at 153.
15. In 1991 alone, 262,871 cases were filed in U.S. District Courts. ADMIV49iRAT'vE OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLoAD STATISTICS: 1991, at 3 (1991). In 1970, that
number was a mere 125,400. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF ThE U.S.: 1992, at 193 (112th ed. 1992).
16. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962).
17. See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods ofAlternative Dispute
Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Operation of
the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 463 (1985).
18. Id
19. Id
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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The summary jury trial is quite simple in practice.2" It consists of: 1) jury
selection; 2) preliminary jury instructions; 3) opening statements; 4) presentation
of evidence by counsel without witnesses; 5) closing arguments; 6) jury
instructions; and 7) the verdict.2' While the verdict is non-binding, it provides
counsel with an average jury's views regarding liability and damages.2 The
advantage of the summary jury trial is that the entire proceeding should not last
more than two days, thus conserving scarce judicial resources.'
While the summary jury trial has had tremendous success in the courts that
have adopted its use,24 debate lingers over the courts' power to compel
participation in summary jury trial proceedings.2  This debate has extended to
the courts' power to open and close such proceedings.26 The Seventh Circuit and
several district courts have extended this power to compel attendance of certain
parties at the summary jury trial proceedings.27
B. The Power to Hold Mandatory
Summary Jury Trials
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter FRCP] grant federal courts
the power to hold summary jury trials.2 Federal Rule 16(a) gives federal courts
the power to "direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to
appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as
(1) expediting the disposition of the action... [or] (5) facilitating the settlement
of the case."29 The summary jury trial is considered a "conference before trial"
20. For a full description of the summary jury trial procedure, see the appendices to Judge
Lambros' report. Lambros, supra note 17, at 480-518. For a more brief description, see Charles W.
Hatfield, The Summary Jury Trial: Who Will Speak For the Jurors?, 1991 J. DIsp. RESOL 151, 152-
55.
21. See S. Arthur Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L REV. 829, 829 (1986).
22. Id
23. Id at 830.
24. Judge Lambros reports a 90% settlement rate of cases that go through the summary jury trial
process. Thomas D. Lambros, The Judge 'sRole in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 VILL L REV.
1363, 1377 (1983-84).
25. Compare Strandell v. Jackson County, IlL, 838 F.2d 884(7th Cir. 1987) (holding that courts
lack the power to compel parties to participate in summary jury trials) with Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988) (holding that courts can compel
parties to participate in summary jury trials).
26. Compare Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 902 (6th Cir.
1988) (holding that courts need not hold summary jury trial proceedings open to the public), cert
denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989) with Charles R. Richey, Rule 16: A Survey and Some Considerations
for the Bench and the Bar, 126 F.R.D. 599, 609 (1989) (Judge Richey states that summary jury trial
proceedings should be held open to the public).
27. See, e.g., G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989); Day,
147 F.R-D. at 153.
28. Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 n.3 (D.
Mass. 1988).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (emphasis added).
1993]
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for purposes of Rule 16.30 Rule 16(c) states that the "participants at any
conferenceunder this rule may consider and take action with respect to... (7) the
possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute .. . and (11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action."3' Furthermore, Rule 1 of the FRCP states that the federal rules "shall
be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."
3 2
Today, as a result of crowded federal dockets,33 some courts have
interpreted Rules 1 and 16 of the FRCP as providing district courts with the
authority to compel parties to participate in summary jury trials." The Seventh
Circuit, however, has held that those same rules can be cited for the proposition
that an order of mandatory participation in a summary jury trial is beyond the
court's power.35
In Strandell v. Jackson County, Illinois,36 the Southern District of Illinois
was faced with a complex civil rights action involving the arrest, strip search,
imprisonment, and suicide of the plaintiff's son.37 The defendants in the case
refused to discuss any potential settlement offers by the plaintiff.38 The judge
suggested that the parties consent to a summary jury trial, but the plaintiff
refused.39 After several more attempts at promoting settlement, the judge ordered
that the parties participate in a summary jury trial against the wishes of the
plaintiff.
40
The district judge cited the 1984 Judicial Conference resolution encouraging
the use of summary jury trials."' The original draft of the resolution encouraged
such use "with the voluntary consent of the parties. "42 However, in the final
draft, this voluntary consent phrase was omitted. The court interpreted this
omission as an endorsement of mandatory summary jury trials.43 The court then
referred to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a basis for mandatory summary
jury trials. It cited Rule 1, Rule 16(a)(1), (5), (c)(ll), and the court's inherent
30. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 904 n.4.
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
33. See supra note 15.
34. See, e.g., Arabian Am. Oil v. Scarfone, 119 F.RLD. 448, 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 123 F.R.D. at 604; McKay v. Ashland Oil, 120 F.R.D. 43, 47-48 (E.D.
Ky. 1988).
35. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
36. 115 F.R1D. 333 (S.D. 111. 1987).
37. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 884.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 884-85.
40. Id. at 885.
41. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 334-35.
42. Id at 335.
43. Id at 334-35.
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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power to manage its docket44 as the supporting authority for such
proceedings.4" In closing, the court recognized the limits of its power to
compel this type of settlement proceeding." While the court felt it had the
power to compel the parties to attend such a proceeding, it recognized that Rule
16 was not intended to force parties into an unwanted settlement.47
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court decision in Strandell and held that the federal courts had no such
power to compel parties to participate in unwanted settlement proceedings.4"
Judge Ripple disagreed with the district court's interpretation that the provisions
of the FRCP authorized the use of mandatory summary jury trials.49 The court
felt that while Rule 16 was intended to provide a forum in which to discuss
settlement,"0 it was not intended to force unwanted settlement negotiations on
parties."
The appellate court went on to criticize the use of mandatory summary jury
trials as seriously affecting "well established rules concerning discovery and work-
product privilege."52 Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were drafted
in order to balance pretrial disclosure with party confidentiality, 3 the mandatory
discovery process54 which results from summary jury trials could upset that
balance by potentially disclosing information which may or may not be
discoverable under Federal Rule 26(b)(3). 55
The Seventh Circuit is the only United States Court of Appeals that has
addressed the issue of the court's power to hold mandatory sunmary jury trials.56
There have, however, been several district courts that have declined to follow the
Strandell decision. 7
44. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
45. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 335.
46. Id.
47. Id at 335-36 (citing Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985)).
48. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
49. I4
50. Id (citing FED. R. CIrv. P. 16 Advisory Committee's note).
51. Id. See also 6A C. WRIGmT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1525
(1990) ("[a]s the Advisory Committee Note [to Rule 161 indicates, this new subdivision does not force
unwilling parties into settlement negotiations").
52. Strandeil, 838 F.2d at 888.
53. Id
54. In a summary jury trial, the court will order the parties to participate in mandatory discovery.
See Lambros, supra note 17, at 480-518.
55. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
56. Russel v. PPG Indus., 953 F.2d 326, 333 (7th Cir. 1992).
57. See, e.g., Day, 147 F.R.D. at 151 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Arabian Am Oil, 119 F.R.D. at 449
(M.D. Fla. 1988); Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 123 F.R.D. at 604 (D. Minn. 1988); Home
Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 n.3 (D. Mass. 1988);
McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
1993]
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C. Power to Open and Close Summary Jury Trials
The United States Supreme Court set out a two-prong test for public
accessibility to court proceedings in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court.58
First, the type of proceeding must be traditionally accessible to the public.59
Second, public access must significantly further the "particular process in
question. 
6o
In Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric Co.,6 the Sixth Circuit
held that the public has no guaranteed right under the First Amendment to attend
summary jury trial proceedings.62 Cincinnati Gas involved a dispute over the
construction of the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Plant.63 The parties in
the case expressed a need for confidentiality of certain discovery material. 6' The
district court complied with the parties' requests for confidentiality by marking
certain documents as "confidential" or "highly confidential.
65
The district court judge subsequently ordered the parties to participate in a
summary jury trial.' Because of the sensitive nature of the discovery material,
the order called for the proceedings to be closed to the public.67 The Cincinnati
Post moved to challenge the order closing the proceedings." When the district
court denied the motion, the Cincinnati Post appealed to the Sixth Circuit.6 9
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the two-prong test developed
in Press-Enterprise.70 The court reasoned that because the summary jury trial
process was developed only eight years before,7' it had not historically been open
to the public, therefore failing the first prong of the Press-Enterprise test.72 The
court further pointed out that settlement techniques have historically been closed
to public access.
73
Regarding the second prong of the public accessibility test, the court stated
that where parties object to public accessibilityin the summary jury trial based on
a genuine concern over confidentiality, such access would have "significant
58. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
59. Id at 8.
60. Id at 8-9.
61. 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988).
62. Id. at 903.








71. See supra text accompanying note 18.
72. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 904.
73. Id at 903.
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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adverse effects on the utility of the procedure as a settlement device."'74 For
these reasons, the Sixth Circuit held that federal courts have the power to keep
summary jury trials closed from public access."'
Historically, settlement proceedings have been private.76 In Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher," the Minnesota Supreme Court observed that
parties often settle in order not to disclose the facts of a particular case to the
public.78 In spite of these decisions, summary jury trials are occasionally held
open to the public. 79
D. Power to Compel Attendance of Individuals
In G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,'" the Seventh Circuit
addressed the issue of court-ordered attendance of individual clients in pretrial
conferences to discuss settlement."' In this case, the magistrate ordered the
defendant to send a "corporate representative with authority to settle" to the
conference.' After the defendant failed to abide by this order, the court imposed
sanctions on the defendant.'
Federal Rule 16(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives the
district courts power to compel attorneys to attend pretrial conferences.84 The
defendant in G. Heileman Brewing argued that by negative implication, the court
lacks the authority to order an attorney's client to attend pretrial conferences.'
The court rejected this argument by stating that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure "do not completely describe and limit the power of the federal
courts."' It further stated that the power to order attendance by individuals falls
within the courts' "inherent power" as set out in Link v. Wabash R.R. 7
Link involved a collision between an automobile and a train.' The court
ordered the attorneys to appear at a pretrial conference.' After one of the
74. Id at 904.
75. Id at 905.
76. Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1985); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst
& Ernst 677 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Securities Litigation, 92 F.R.D.
468, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd sub norm.
77. 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986).
78. Id at 205.
79. See, e.g., Day, 147 F.R.D. at 152.
80. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
81. Id. at 651-53.
82. Id at 650.
83. Id
84. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
85. G. Heileman Brewing, 871 F.2d at 650.
86. Id. at 651 (citing HMG Property Investors, Inc. v. Parque Indus. Rio Canas, Inc., 847 F.2d
908, 915 (1st Cir. 1988)).
87. 370 U.S. 626 (1962). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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attorneys failed to appear, the court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute
and stated that such dismissal was in the "exercise of its inherent power."'  The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision stating that courts have "inherent
power . . . to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the" orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases."' Courts have used this logic to find that
mandatory attendance at summary jury trials is not inconsistent with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, but merely an extension of the powers set out by these
Rules.9
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In the Day decision, Judge Spiegel began by pointing out that summary jury
trials are not binding on the parties.93 He points out, however, that the summary
jury trial does give the attorneys and their clients a good indication of what the
verdict would be in a "full-blown" trial.94 After explaining the summary jury
trial process,95 the court stated that in the Sixth Circuit, district courts have the
authority to hold mandatory summary jury trials. 96
The court next went on to address its power to open and close summary jury
trial proceedings. 7 Judge Spiegel explained that the decision to keep a summary
jury trial open or closed is within the court's "managerial discretion. '" Judge
Spiegel further pointed out that the Sixth Circuit has given district courts the
power to close summary jury trials to the public.99 The court reasoned that
because it has the power to close such proceedings, it surely must have the lesser
power to keep the summary jury trial open."
Judge Spiegel rejected the argument that the defendants would not be able to
receive a fair trial if the proceedings were held open to the public.'' He felt
that a detailed jury questionnaire and proper voir dire would insure a fair trial on
the merits. 2
90. Id. at 629.
91. * Id at 630-31.
92. See, e.g., Day, 147 F.R.D. at 153-54.
93. Day, 147 F.R.D. at 150.
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
96. Day, 147 F.R.D. at 151. Judge Spiegel relies on Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 903 n.4, for
this proposition.
97. Day, 147 F.R.D at 151.
98. Id.
99. Id (citing Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 900).
100. Id. The court reasoned that because closing the summary jury trial to the public implicates
First Amendment protection, it must be a greater power than keeping such proceedings open which
implicates no First Amendment protection. Id
101. Id at 152-53.
102. Id In theory, a proper voir dire would screen out jurors with a predisposition to decide
the case one way or another because of publicity about the case.
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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The court opined that it would be particularly inappropriate to close the
summary jury trial in the instant case for two reasons.' 03 First, this action is a
class action suit, and second, the defendants are being indemnified by the United
States government." 4 Because this is a class action, the court stated that it
would be unfair to prevent class members from being informed about the
proceedings, therefore preventing them from taking part in possible settlement
decisions. 5 Judge Spiegel pointed out that because the defendants are being
indemnified by the United States government, the taxpayers would ultimately be
responsible for any judgment. 10 6 The court concluded that the public has an
interest in attending the summary jury trial because it may result in settlement.'"'
Finally, the court addressed the issue of mandatory attendanceby top officers
of the parties.'8 Judge Spiegel pointed out that the particular district court
involved in this case has always required the attendance of individual clients at
summary jury trials."° This is done to give the decision makers a chance to
gauge the strengths and weaknesses of the case." 0 For this reason, the court
held that it had the authority to order the attendance of top officers of each party
(including government officials) at the summary jury trial."'
V. COMMENT
A. The Power to Compel Participation
The debate over the power to compel parties to participate in summary jury
trials rages on in legal circles. At the center of this debate lie Federal Rules 1 and
16. Some feel that forced participation exceeds judicial authority," 2 while
others feel that forced participation in summary jury trials falls within the courts'
inherent power to control their dockets." 3
Summary jury trials have proven to be a successful means of relieving the
burden on court dockets."4 Federal Rule 16 gives federal courts the power to




107. Id at 152-53.




112. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 16, 44 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. But see Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury
Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U.
CIi. L. REv. 366, 383-85 (1986) (statistical evidence fails to show an increased settlement rate where
summary jury trials are employed).
19931
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direct attorneys and unrepresented parties to attend pretrial conferences for the
purpose of facilitating settlement." 5 Federal Rule 1 provides that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be "construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."" 6
In order for summary jury trials to maintain the successful settlement rate of
the past,". FRCP 16 must be read liberally to encompass summary jury trials.
Many courts have been willing to give FRCP 16 such a liberal reading."' In
Day, Judge Spiegel stated that federal district courts do have the power to compel
parties to participate in summary jury trials." 9 The authority Judge Spiegel
relied on appears to be inappropriate. The Day decision relies on Footnote Four
in Cincinnati Gas2° for the proposition that district courts have the power to
compel parties to attend summary jury trial proceedings.'
While Footnote Four in Cincinnati Gas does discuss the court's inherent
power to manage its docket, it does not find that courts have the power to hold
mandatory summary jury trials. The Cincinnati Gas case dealt with the power to
hold such proceedings open to the public."~ Footnote Four merely states that
district courts have the power to conduct summary jury trials pursuant to the
inherent power to manage its docket along with Federal Rule 16.
While it appears that Judge Spiegel may have reached too far by citing
Cincinnati Gas as authorizing the use of mandatory summary jury trials, his
decision is consistent with that of several other district courts.'3 In order to
preserve the usefulness of the summary jury trial, district court judges must have
the power to compel parties to participate in these proceedings.
B. Power to Open and Close Summary Jury Trials
The right of the public to attend judicial trials has been standard practice in
the English judicial system from "time immemorial.' '124  Because of this
historical right of access, a presumption of openness arises in court proceedings;
there are, however, recognized exceptions to a presumed right of access. One such
exception is for settlement proceedings.'25
As noted above, settlement proceedings have not been open to the public
historically. 26 The reasons for this are obvious. There is certain information
115. FED. R. CWV. P. 16(a)(5).
116. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
117. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., G. Heileman Brewing, 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989); Day, 147 F.R.D. at 153.
119. Day, 147 F.R.D. at 153.
120. 854 F.2d at 903 n.4.
121. Day, 147 F.R.D. at 151.
122. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., G. Ieileman Brewing, 871 F.2d 648; Day, 147 F.R.D. at 153.
124. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1980).
125. See Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1985).
126. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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that a party may wish to keep confidential which may, nonetheless, be useful in
promoting settlement. Parties may, however, be unwilling to reveal such
information if it is subject to public scrutiny.
The summary jury trial is a tool to promote settlement,'" and therefore,
logic would dictate that such proceedings be held in private. Standard practice
among district courts, however, is to leave the decision of public access to the
discretion of the presiding judge."
While the idea that summary jury trials should be open to the public is a
good one and deserves merit, courts should be careful in exercising that discretion.
If any party to a dispute voices strong objections to both the mandatory nature of
the proceedings and the public access to the process, a judge should carefully
consider the decisions regarding the use of the summary jury trial. The risk of a
party not revealing relevant information or not participating to its fullest extent is
high where such strong opposition has been voiced. Without full participation and
disclosure by all parties, it is unlikely that the verdict(s) from the summary jury
trial will have a strong or useful effect.
C. Power to Compel Attendance of Individuals
The burgeoning caseload of federal district courts129 requires judges to
exercise alternatives to time-consuming trials. As noted above, the summary jury
trial has proven to be an excellent tool for easing that caseload. 3 ° The verdict
from a summary jury trial gives the parties a good indication of the potential
outcome of a real trial.
Because the parties, not their attomeys, are ultimately responsible for
decisions regarding settlement, it is imperative that theybe aware of all the aspects
of litigation. It is obvious that a party is better able to make those decisions if
they are present at any settlement negotiations. The same can be said for
summary jury trial proceedings. When the actual parties hear the evidence
themselves, they are better able to take their attorney's advice and couple it with
their own observations to make a more informed decision.
127. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
128. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Summay Jury Trals: Judges Should Have Call on Use,
Closure of Proceeding, Lambros Says, 2 Alternative Dispute Resolution Report 251, 253 (July 21,
1988).
129. See supra note 15 and accompanying text
130. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
19931
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VI. CONCLUSION
The summary jury trial has taken its lumps from both courts and
commentators. Nevertheless, it continues to thrive as a viable form of alternative
dispute resolution. As long as district judges continue to support the summary
jury trial as Judge Spiegel and others have done, it will further develop into an
excellent weapon in the fight against excessive litigation.
12




Shortly before this Note went to press, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's holding in Day. Judge Merritt,
speaking for the three judge panel, held that federal courts lack the power to
compel unwilling parties to participate in summary jury trials."' The court
stated that the district court erred in relying on Cincinnati Gas as authorizing
mandatory summary jury trials.132  The Circuit Court pointed out that the
Cincinnati Gas decision addressed the court's power to exclude the press from
summary jury trial proceedings, but did not address the power to compel
participation.'
The Sixth Circuit chose instead to rely on the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Strandell.134 The court agreed with Judge Ripple's analysis in Strandell of the
advisory committee notes to Federal Rule 16(c)(7) indicating that no authority
exists to compel unwilling parties to participate in settlement negotiations.'
While the court did encourage the use of settlement techniques designed to
facilitate early settlement, it refused to extend judicial power to "coerce" that
settlement.
36
The court then went on to address the reliance on the inherent authority of
the courts to manage their dockets. 31 It again refused to expand judicial power,
fearing that such expansion would foster "judicial high-handedness.' 38
In summary, Judge Merritt praised the use of the summary jury trial as a
valuable settlement tool.'39 He stated, however, that the effectiveness of such
a tool is dependent upon the voluntary cooperation of the participating parties. 4
He stated further that if the summary jury trial does indeed provide realistic
expectations of assessing the parties' liability, then naturally the parties will
voluntarily participate in such proceedings. 4'
The Sixth Circuit's analysis of the district court's decision is technically
correct. This reversal, however, places a stigma on the summary jury trial.
Without the power to hold mandatory summary jury trials, it will be difficult to
bolster acceptance of the process. Judge Spiegel may have gone too far in
131. In re NLO, Inc., No. 93-3065, 1993 WL 356412, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept 17, 1993).
132. Id. at *3.
133. Id.
134. Id. See supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the StrandeU decision.
135. NLO, Inc., 1993 WL 356412, at *4.
136. Id.
137. Id
138. Id. (citing G. Heileman Brewing, 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting)).
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forcing the parties to participate in the summary jury trial and allowing public
access to the proceedings against the will of the parties. He has, however, placed
the summary jury trial on the front lines in the battle against the litigation
explosion. The Sixth Circuit has made it more difficult to fight this battle, but
other districts still employ the use of mandatory summary jury trials; until the
Supreme Court addresses this issue, the war rages on.
T. ROBERT COOK
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